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Abstract
Musicologists have recently begun applying the diverse philosophies of Deleuze and Guattari to music.
Most contributors strive for rigorous adherence to early Deleuzian principles-a position I refer to as
"orthodox"-and are therefore hesitant to posit any sort of musical objecthood or listener subjectivity. By
contrast, this article espouses an approach I deem "pragmatic," which takes as points of departure
pragmatist theories found in the work of Richard Rorty, as well as Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand
Plateaus. Though one may initially point to the irreconcilable differences in their approaches, both Rorty
and Deleuze were more interested in creative readings of canonical philosophers than in representing
them objectively. My article, in turn, takes the same approach with the philosophies of Deleuze and
Guattari, particularly their pragmatic theories of linguistics. After identifying this element as the driving
force behind the "becoming" so central to their philosophy, the article closes with a pragmatic
Deleuzo-Guattarian listening experiment involving Sigur Rós's piece "Untitled One."
Résumé
Les musicologues
 ont récemment commencé à appliquer les diverses philosophies de Deleuze et Guattari 
à la que. La plupart des contributeurs s'efforcent de respecter rigoureusement des principes de base 
deleuziens, une position que j'appelle « orthodoxe ». Ils hésitent donc à affirmer toute sorte de musique 
objective ou d'auditeur subjectif. En revanche, cet article propose une approche que je juge
«pragmatique», qui prend comme points de départ des théories pragmatistes qui se trouvent dans l'oeuvre 
de Richard Rorty, ainsi que Mille Plateaux de Deleuze et Guattari. Bien que l'on puisse voir les
différences inconciliables dans leurs approches, Rorty et Deleuze étaient plus intéressés par l'
interprétation créative des philosophes canoniques que dans une représentation objective. Mon article, à
son tour, adopte la même approche en employant les philosophies de Deleuze et Guattari, en particulier 
leurs théories sur la linguistique pragmatique. Après avoir identifié cet élément comme force motrice 
derrière le «devenir» au coeur de leur philosophie, l'article se termine avec une expérience pragmatique
auditoire où « Untitled One » de Sigur Rós nous serviront comme modèle de ce phénomène.
Recently, musicologists have begun applying the diverse philosophies of Deleuze (and Guattari) to music 
(1)
. Most contributors strive for rigorous adherence to early Deleuzian principles-a position I refer to as
"orthodox"-and are therefore hesitant to posit any sort of musical objecthood or listener subjectivity. But
how is this position possible when speaking of musical experience? Perception, even in a collective
assemblage (2), still necessitates a listening subject, while aesthetics, with or without an
ontologically-stable musical object, still references an object qua the noun described. Thus, many
orthodox Deleuzo-Guattarian analyses fall short of the subverted subject/object positions they promise,
supplanting an analytical method (music a shares attribute x with Deleuzian philosophy b, thus a=b?) as a
metaphoric sleight of hand.
By contrast, this essay espouses an approach to Deleuzo-Guattarian musicology I deem "pragmatic." A
pragmatic Deleuzo-Guattarian musicology acknowledges the subject and object positions inherited from
Enlightenment practices as a first step toward deterritorializing them, toward proliferating them in all
directions (3). In accordance with the postmodern sobriety of A Thousand Plateaus (contra the modernist
excess of Difference and Repetition, a point to which I will return (4)), I suggest that to avoid completely
evacuating music-analytical thought of its referents a pragmatic stratification of subject and object must
be preserved. This thesis is corroborated by passages of A Thousand Plateauswarning us of "emptied"
and "cancerous" bodies, which, by failing to hold onto any fragment of subjectivity, become lost in a sea
of schizophrenia (5).
The essay proceeds in three plateaus as follows. First, a précis of key points from Rorty's theory of
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pragmatism, as well as those from A Thousand Plateaus, provides the philosophical underpinnings.
Second, I review some of the secondary musicological literature involving Deleuze and Guattari, focusing
particularly on problems associated with orthodox approaches, and suggest how a pragmatic approach to
Deleuze and Guattari might liberate more vivid musical insight. Third, as an illustration of what a
pragmatic Deleuzo-Guattarian musicology might look like, I provide an account of a listening experiment
emphasizes the pragmatic "schizoanalysis" and "nomad thought" found throughout A Thousand Plateaus.
I demonstrate that many of the unimaginative fallouts found in the "orthodox" readings I discuss in the
second plateau can be avoided, ironically, through a closer reading of Deleuze and Guattari's own theory
of pragmatism.
First Plateau: Pragmatism in Rorty and
Deleuze and Guattari
My ideas on pragmatism are influenced by readings of both the late neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard
Rorty, as well as Deleuze and Guattari's writings on pragmatism found throughout A Thousand Plateaus.
For Deleuze and Guattari, pragmatics is simply another name for the mode of thought they espouse
throughout the rest of the book: "rhizomatics, stratoanalysis, schizoanalysis, nomadology, micropolitics,
pragmatics, the science of multiplicities". (6) Rather than recapitulate oft-cited quotes from A Thousand
Plateaus regarding this central tenet of the book, the following discussion will center on Rorty's
philosophy, highlighting some of the many analogues in Deleuze and Guattari's theory of pragmatism,
especially its most sustained exposition in "Postulates of Linguistics" (7).
One resounding characteristic of Rorty's pragmatism is his lack of patience with the analytic
philosophical style in which he was trained. He urges that many of the great problems posed by
philosophers like Russell and Wittgenstein were nothing more than "language games" (8). Though, to be
clear, Rorty is very sympathetic to the importance of language-Rorty often speaks to the primacy and 
contingency of language. Much of his work can be read not only as a critique of the analytical style, but
as a critique of metaphysics: "A postmetaphysical culture seems to me no more impossible than a
postreligious one, and equally desirable" (9). By postmetaphysical, Rorty desires a society that accepts the
contingency of its own language-its inability to describe the "real" world-thus accepting that language is
only capable of describing other language (10). He concludes that philosophy, like empirical science (as
much as a scientist might dispute this), is merely another literary genre, no more capable of unveiling
truth than Orwell or Shakespeare.
As an anti-metaphysicist, it should be clear that Rorty aims to align his mode of thought with Hegelian 
(11)
, rather than Kantian traditions. What this means for analysis, musical or otherwise should be clear
from the following quotation:
"To say that we should drop the idea of truth as out there waiting to be discovered is not to say that we
have discovered that, out there, there is no truth. It is to say that our purposes would be served best by
ceasing to see truth as a deep matter, as a topic of philosophical interest, or 'true' as a term which repays
'analysis'. 'The nature of truth' is an unprofitable topic, resembling in this respect 'the nature of man' and
'the nature of God'" (12).
This speaks to a consistent problem in recent adaptations of Deleuzo-Guattarian thought to music. By
straining to keep consistent with these often-inconsistent philosophies, many commentators find
themselves straining to say anything meaningful about music (13). In other words, musicological writings
of this nature often sacrifice musicality in favor of rigid specificity. As Rorty warns: "Chances are that we
will judge rigor more exactingly than any other parameter of value such as interest, involvement, or
contribution to the culture" (14).While he draws significant inspiration from a diverse field of
philosophical traditions, Rorty's application of those texts is not a faithful rendering of the philosophies
contained within them (15). Instead, Rorty is interested in re-interpretation, or, what we can do with those
philosophies. And it is here that we may observe his shared interest with Deleuze-esoteric readings of
canonical philosophers-or what Zizek has called philosophical "buggery" (16). Paradoxically, the most
faithful application of Deleuzian philosophy may be that which is most reverently unfaithful. In his
creative readings of such diverse thinkers as Spinoza, Nietzsche, Proust, Kafka, and others, Deleuze
rarely strived to portray an accurate representation of that philosopher's works. Rather, on par with his
consistent focus on creation (17), Deleuze was more interested in deterritorializing those philosophies into
something new (18).
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This action-the creative application of a philosophy-is precisely what my essay does with the philosophies
of Deleuze and Guattari. Though, as I will show, these creative applications, if built around Deleuze and
Guattari's pragmatic theories of linguistics, are simultaneously the most faithful as well (19). Ultimately,
like Rorty and Deleuze and Guattari, I am more interested in what we do with these philosophies than
how stoically we represent the philosopher. Thus, the question I would ask of such an analysis is: how
does this application allow us to think differently about music, or about Deleuze and Guattari? Not: how
faithfully does this application reproduce the central tenets of Deleuze and Guattari? (20)
Second Plateau: Orthodoxy and Pragmatism in
Deleuzo-Guattarian Musicology-Four
Approaches
Orthodox Pragmatic
(Analytical) Musical object a shares Deleuzian attribute x thus music a is x, thus music a is Deleuzian (Creative) Applying Deleuzo-Guattarian principles without regard to how faithfully they represent the
tenets of Deleuze and Guattari, but rather how they liberate musical thought
(Metaphysical) Careful not to interpret Deleuze and Guattari, steadfast to their principles, reverent. (Becoming) Admits subject and object positions in order to deterritorialize them.
Example 1. Four Approaches to Deleuzo-Guattarian Musicology
Example 1 represents the two positions I have identified in Deleuzo-Guattarian musicology: orthodox
and pragmatic. Each of these two positions can then be subdivided into two distinct approaches. Within
the orthodox position, there are two distinct approaches to which I will take objection. The first approach,
which I have labeled as "analytical," a title which imparts a relationship to analytical philosophy, focuses
on labeling musical elements with Deleuzian attributes. Another orthodox approach, which I call
"metaphysical," focuses more on remaining true to early Deleuzian rhetoric and methodology, and thus
must avoid talk of two important elements of musicology-subject and object positions-since it is largely
believed that those two elements lie outside the bounds of Deleuze and Guattari's metaphysics, even
though these positions, destabilized as they may be, are completely in accordance with the pragmatist
philosophy of A Thousand Plateaus.
In the right hand column of Example 1 are the two approaches I have labeled as pragmatic, though I am
not claiming that writers in this genre take any direct inspiration from any pragmatist philosopher other
than Deleuze and Guattari-merely, that these approaches may be fruitfully aligned. The "creative"
approach (which I will align with Hallward's theory of "creation" in Deleuze) focuses not on remaining
true to Deleuzo-Guattarian rhetoric, as in the metaphysical approach, but rather on how we can apply this
philosophy to musical thought. Within the "becoming" approach, instead of denying the subject and
object positions, authors admit these positions as necessary components of musical description. I will
later show that it is only by acknowledging these positions that we can begin to deterritorialize them.
In his 2008 article, Michael Gallope's primary focus is on the Deleuzian concept of the virtual versus the
actual (21). The overarching problem I find in Gallope's argument is that he cannot talk about a musical
work in any conventional sense, since that would entail acknowledging an objecthood he finds not a
propos for Deleuzian metaphysics-a problem characteristic of the "metaphysical" approach I have
defined. Such approaches often misinterpret passages such as the following:
"In what sense is the statement always collective even when it seems to be emitted by a solitary
singularity like that of the artist? The answer is that the statement never refers back to the subject. Nor
does it refer back to a double-that is, to two subjects, one of which would act as the cause or the subject
of enunciation and the other as a function of the subject of the statement. There isn't a subject who emits
the statement or a subject about which the statement would be emitted" (22).
But this passage in no way denies our ability to talk of subjects and objects. It only provides a Barthesian
rebuttal to the linearity of interpretation often attributed to structuralism. Since Gallope refuses to speak
of objects or subjects, he instead chooses to speak of a "transcendental empiricism," which he takes from
Deleuze's essay "Immanence, a Life" (23). He claims that, if we are going to find a "Deleuzian musical
work," it will be one that lets us tune in to the virtual, one that helps us escape our sedimented existence
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in actual, worldly relations. But how can one begin to think about a "work," or any noun for that matter,
without acknowledging an object? Gallope claims that Deleuze would have us liquidate any sort of
objectivity (whether that object be a musical work, performer, composer, history, structure, score,
notation, culture, etc.) in favor of pure sensation.
Gallope is pushing Deleuze down an anti-humanist path that renders listening subjects void, even
generalizing what we might call musical perception to "percepts," which are indifferent to listening
subjects (24). However, this mode of analysis does not escape subjectivity, it merely relocates the listening
subject from the realm of the individual to a sort of Jungian listening collective. This idealistic collective
is, anthropologically speaking, irresponsible, since it ignores our unique musical dispositions and prior
experiences-in other words, our personal musical histories.
After laying his theoretical groundwork, Gallope conducts an analysis of a supposedly Deleuzian musical
work, and in this reflects the second, "analytical" approach I will describe shortly. His musical object
(though he would not call it that) is not a score, composer, or piece, but a performance by Whitney
Houston of "One Moment in Time." Here, Gallope takes too literal a cue from the Deleuzian concept of
"absolute vibration," crafting an ill-conceived analogy to purely musical vibration, and in this we can
even sense an extreme Hanslickian formalism.
Ian Buchanon's article on Deleuzian approaches to pop music articulates the other orthodox approach:
"analytical" (25). The refrain is one of the most complex and multi-faceted aspects of A Thousand
Plateaus-demanding the constant negotiation of territory, re-territory, and de-territory-yet Buchanon pays
little homage to the complexity of the concept (26). His entire argument reduces to "pop music is a
refrain," exemplified clearly in the following passage:
"A housewife might sing to herself as she washes the dishes, or else have the radio playing in the
background, and by so doing build a wall of sound around her to shelter a precious interiority, her
self-created reserve of inner strength. [...]. The refrain [...] is essentially territorial, territorializing, or
reterritorializing, and it quickly reclaims music for itself" (27).
Clearly, Buchanon envisions the refrain as a subject-creating position. But this is surely not the point of
music. Deleuze and Guattari describe music as powerful in its ability to deterritorialize the refrain (28), to
create a line of flight away from the subjective. This misreading leads Buchanon to an irreconcilable
contradiction. If pop music is, indeed, a Deleuzo-Guattarian refrain (and, if so, why can only pop music
do this?) then it should draw us ever inward, as subjects (29). But what we see happening instead with pop
music consumption is that it incites pack formation (30). Buchanon's contradiction is set in motion later on
this same page, as he asserts:
"A tune that sticks in your head and can be easily whistled or hummed is a refrain; a tune that requires
more than one set of lips to whistle or hum is, by virtue of this inherent polyvocality, becoming-musical
[...]. What popular music does is set in motion a becoming-minor, or, what amounts to the same thing, a
becoming-public of the otherwise private individual which as Deleuze and Guattari have said, is the
initiation of a line of flight that is an escape" (31).
Buchanon's analytical methodology (music a is a Deleuzo-Guattarian x) is responsible for this confusion.
Had he not set out to make this analytical claim, the article could have proceeded by discussing the
spectrum of ways we appraise popular music, from the individual to the collective. Popular music could
serve not only as a refrain, but also as a mode of pack formation, and these need not be mutually
exclusive.
A more pragmatic approach to Deleuzo-Guattarian musicology takes as its point of departure not only
Rorty and Nietzsche, but A Thousand Plateaus itself. Much of this tradition can be described as creation,
of creativity. This point is articulated thoroughly in Peter Hallward's recent book. Like Rorty and Deleuze
and Guattari, Hallward's focus is on what we do with the philosophies of Deleuze (and Guattari, to a
lesser extent). Hallward synthesizes many fundamental tenets of Deleuzian philosophy by showing that
its multi-faceted plateaus can fruitfully be read as different articulations of the same general point: "if all
being is creativity, it can only fully become so through the tendential evacuation of all actual or creaturely
mediation" (32).
As an example of this pragmatic approach, consider Michael Klein's article "Debussy's L'Isle joyeuse as
Territorial Assemblage," which addresses the problem of the Deleuzian subject (33). Klein starts with a
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working definition of a Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblage: "Put more succinctly than Deleuze and Guattari
might have found comfortable, an assemblage is a multiplicity that refuses to stand still long enough for
us to unify it in the branches of a single structure" (34). Within this sentence alone, we can read an
opposition to both orthodox approaches exemplified by Buchanon and Gallope. Klein is pragmatically
reshaping an applicable model of the territorial assemblage for the purposes of analyzing a piece of
music. His interest is clearly in a subjective account of this music ("for us to unify it"), a
becoming-oriented attitude that bespeaks a pragmatic interpretation of the Deleuzian subject.
While Buchanon's binary analytical method leads him to confusion (does the refrain equal
territorialization or deterritorialization?), Klein's pragmatic approach highlights the relationship between
territorialization and deterritorialization:
"Deleuzian narratives follow the model of the bird's song, beginning with chaos, within a milieu of
milieus [...]. within chaos, the bird's song marks a milieu, a safe place that is the first act of order. From
the safety of its milieu, the bird finds objectives that extend into other milieus and create a territory [...].
At the conclusion of a Deleuzian narrative, the expressive territory releases joyous energy into the
cosmos" (35).
The initial birdsong clearly marks out a territory. By extending its song into other milieus, the bird
deterritorializes, becoming part of a collective assemblage; yet this act reterritorializes into a larger
territory. The final act of releasing joyous (musical) energy into the cosmos represents a grand synthesis
of birdsong, something Deleuze and Guattari might herald as one step closer to the Body without Organs
(though relative deterritorializations are different in kind from their unattainable absolute-the BwO).
Klein's article demonstrates Deleuzian approaches to many distinct objects: the Debussy piece in the
article's title, Watteau's paintings of the island of Cythera, and Bergsonian models of time. By attenuating
the academic desire for analytical rigor in favor of broad analytical strokes, he also exemplifies the
"creative" approach. Klein states that this pragmatic approach is, as I have suggested, itself directly in line
with Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy:
"The alert reader will have realized that this Deleuzian interpretation with its emphasis on music as
territory is at odds with the Bergsonian one, in which the static tonal center denies a sense of space. This
incongruity, however, is not problematical from a Deleuzian perspective, which rejects any demand for a
unitary outlook capable of synthesizing stray observations in the service of an economical, unified
narrative" (36).
This quintessentially Deleuzian task of creatively re-reading historical bodies is taken up by Marianne
Kielian-Gilbert's recent chapter "Music and the Difference in Becoming" (37). Kielian-Gilbert's article
analyzes the process of "becoming-music" in a range of musical works, some canonical, some less so.
Among them: Bach's Cello Suite in G Major, "El Tango de Roxanne" from Moulin Rouge, and
Stravinsky's Tango for Piano Solo. She describes her approach to analysis as a "shift from representation
(via analogy, identity, opposition, or resemblance) to movement/composition by speeds and intensities" 
(38)
. A process of analysis that circumvents these four strata (which Deleuze originally presented in 
Difference and Repetition) guides her philosophy of becoming-music (39).
Kielian-Gilbert is also interested in using feminist theory to circumvent these strata. This comes through
most clearly in her use of theories of "performance" and "performative" gestures put forth by Irigaray and
others:
"This shifting into performing is a crucial dimension of becoming. The critical move-with philosophical,
theoretical, social, and experiential implications-is toward performative expressivity and away from
objectifying music as a text; that is, as a passive bearer of qualities. In this performing/expressivity,
encounters with the inventive and the novel align with new ways of experiencing and thinking" (40).
What I find most fascinating about Kielian-Gilbert's article is that, though she embodies the "creative"
approach to musical becoming quite well, she does so through a rather orthodox reading of A Thousand
Plateaus. Both Scherzinger and Gallope have identified a distinct turn in A Thousand Plateaus when
compared to Deleuze's solo work (e.g., Difference and Repetition). While Scherzinger has identified this
"second moment" as a "postmodern sobriety" (41), Gallope identifies it as a shift from a predominantly
metaphysical theory toward an ethical one in which "we move far beyond mere affirmation or repetition,
using music to become one with animal and plant life" (42).
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After identifying this pragmatic, creative element in A Thousand Plateaus, I would now like to conclude
by illustrating this process of becoming through a description of a listening experiment. I hope to
demonstrate Kielian-Gilbert's assertion that becoming is about "performative expressivity" rather than
objectification through this creative, pragmatic experience.
Third Plateau: A Pragmatic
Deleuzo-Guattarian Listening
Experiment-Sigur Rós, "Untitled One"
"Becomings-animal are neither dreams nor phantasies. They are perfectly real. But which reality is at
issue here? For if Becoming-animal does not consist in playing animal or imitating animal, if it is clear
that the human being does not 'really' become something else. Becoming produces nothing other than
itself [...]. What is real is the Becoming itself, the block of Becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms
through which that which Becomes passes [...]. The Becoming-animal of the human being is real, even if
the animal the human being becomes is not" (43).
Becoming-animal, like becoming-musical, entails movements of speed and slowness along a plane of
consistency, both reflecting the smoothness that encompasses the sum total of a Deleuzo-Guattarian
rhizomatic universe (44). In Francis Bacon, Deleuze posits, "Man becomes animal, but he does not
become so without the animal simultaneously becoming spirit, the spirit of man, the physical spirit of
man presented in the mirror as Eumenides or fate" (45). I will suggest that becoming-music has much to do
with this mirror metaphor (a point to which I will return through a reading of Rosolato), the mirror acting
as a metaphor for the reciprocal deterritorialization of listening subject and musical object.
This approach to listening suggests the work of psychoanalyst Guy Rosolato. His research stresses the
infant's developmental shift whereby the voice (of the mother) is transformed from pure sonorous
material to signifying language. According to Rosolato, the voice is "at the same time emitted and heard,
sent and received, and for the subject himself, it is as if, in comparison with the look, an 'acoustic' mirror
were always functioning" (46). This particular passage from Rosolato is powerful for pragmatic
Deleuzo-Guattarian musicology precisely because of this mirror metaphor-suggesting we are at once,
through the magic of music, traversing a constantly deterritorialized space between listening subject and
musical object, between receiver and creator.
As a process, becoming-music necessitates and begins with desire (and who among us does not desire a
more intimate relationship with our musical objects?) (47). I suggest that a desire for becoming-intimate
provides the initial motivation (either consciously or sub-consciously) to deterritorialization. As John
Rahn states:
"Human life and music listened to by that life do not run parallel in straight lines never meeting, but
rather Intertwine [capitalization in original] closely, touching each other all over, each penetrating and
being penetrated by the other, so that while they touch they almost fuse into one entity, one life-music or
music-life. All the complexities of human being-in-time are there for music's being-in-life and life's
being-in-music" (48).
The mating ritual of the green anaconda illustrates Rahn's imagery quite well (49). The two large snakes
entwine their bodies in such an intricate way that it is nearly impossible for an observer to tell where one
begins and the other ends, to which snake any given segment belongs. Becoming-music, an action
initially sparked by the listening subject's desire for intimacy with the musical object, likewise gradually
approaches a becoming-imperceptible between the two, much like the anacondas' entwining.
"Such an experience is not possible with your subjectivity in the foreground, for this will yield frustration
at the uncentered authorship of the compositional object [...] you can use the music and its processes to
clear the mind so that it can lead to a state of communion, of release from subjectivity [...]. We must then
allow ourselves to be passive receptacles for sensual resonances" (50).
But what practical listening strategies can a listener undertake in order to facilitate such a transformation?
Deleuze and Guattari provide no strict guidelines for this, leaving it up to the listener to play a sort of
pragmatic jazz:
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"Schizoanalysis, or pragmatics has no other meaning: Make a rhizome. But you don't know what you can
make a rhizome with, you don't know which subterranean stem is effectively going to make a rhizome, or
enter a becoming, people your desert. So experiment" (51).
My experimental map of the path toward becoming-imperceptible entails deterritorialization of three
strata: subjectification, objectification, and signification (52). With this Deleuzo-Guattarian framework in
place, I conclude by reproducing my first-person (though, since each of us is several, there is hopefully
"quite a crowd") account with this listening experiment (53).
Sigur Rós's sound evolves glacially, and is marked by two characterestic textures: lead vocalist Jón Þór
"Jónsi" Birgisson's characteristic falsetto, and a distorted guitar played legato with a violin bow. Their
second full-length album, simply titled ( ), consists of eight untitled tracks. The vocal text is sung in
gibberish, with blank pages provided for the listener to pen individual interpretations of the phonemes.
"Untitled One" is the six-and-a-half minute opening track. Devoid of percussion, the texture is filled with
string quartet and several different keyboard timbres. The first half of the song's form repeats a
five-measure ground bass [D-?B-m?Fm?E-?A-] as the voice gradually ascends into a falsetto tessitura for
a climax that features thicker textures and normative four-measure phrasing.
Desubjectification
In attempting to desubjectify myself, I was constantly drawn to the sight of my physical body. In order to
open the flows of becoming-intimate, I simply turned out the lights (54). Other environmental distractions
were neutralized by pulling the shades, turning off phones, and by having the studio monitors loud
enough to block any ambient noise. The experiment was undertaken under different states of hunger,
exhaustion, stress, happiness, and exercise. I found that my body was most conducive to musical intimacy
after exercising, eating, and when I was in a relatively stress-free state of mind.
The greatest stratum to overcome was self-reflectivity: "I am listening to this music in order to conduct an
experiment ([...] this is a really great project [...]. I think it's working [...] except I'm thinking about myself
again)." Ecofeminist author Starhawk experiences similar self-conscious moments in her experiments
with becoming-wilderness:
"Few of us can walk into a forest and simply be in the forest. Instead, by adulthood we are inside a story
we're telling ourselves. Sometimes it's a story about our own weakness and inadequacy. Sometimes it's a
story about how wonderful we are: 'I'm so spiritual. I'm attuned to the trees so much more sensitively
than anyone else' [...]. Whatever inner dialogue we're running, it's interference. We end up walking
around inside our own heads, not in the woods" (55).
But what does it mean to desubjectify into a state of musical intimacy? Certainly, this entails different
activities for different listening subjects. Perhaps performing music, looking at or visualizing familiar
scores, or involving one's self kinesthetically (through yoga or dance) with a musical object may aid in
this process. In my initial preparations for the Sigur Rós experiment, I began by playing the piece at the
piano, then stood barefoot on the studio floor, letting the rhythms of the piece move through me as I
responded kinesthetically through dance.
Deobjectification
Through an analysis of Bacon's Sweeney Agonistes triptych, Deleuze addresses the role of the mouth in
differentiating the head and the face. For Deleuze, while the head represents the perfect deterritorializable
site for becoming-animal, the face is always a black hole of signification. He writes, "the mouth acquires
that power of de-localization which turns all of the meat into a head without a face [...]. it is no longer a
specific organ, but the hole through which the entire body escapes, and through which the flesh drops" (56)
. Deleuze's conception of the mouth as a resonance for meat suggests to me a strategy for
becoming-music whereby the voice, in a pre-signifying function very similar to that described by
Rosolato, acts as a sonorous bridge between listening subject and musical object.
Jónsi's voice is very different than my own. While his raspy tenor slips effortlessly into a falsetto,
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reaching focused and projected pitches as high as many altos, I am a baritone, full and round in the lower
registers, getting pinched and nasally around E4/F4. I had hypothesized that singing along might allow
me to deobjectify and entwine with the musical object, but the difference in our vocal timbres only served
to highlight the disconnect between my own voice and the disembodied musical object recorded by
another subject-cum-musical object. Feeling the sympathetic muscular reactions in my own mouth (the
meat)-tensing as Jónsi climbs into ever higher tessituras-proved to be more effective. I also noticed my
body involuntarily pulsing with the slow but steady rhythm of the piano accompaniment. Both of these
kinesthetic involvements were unconscious, and reflect a corporeal intimacy similar to the sympathetic
and rhythmic bodily entwining two human beings (or anacondas) may experience during expressions of
sexual intimacy.
Another unfortunate stumbling block to deobjectification came when I realized that I was sympathizing
and gyrating with a digital audio file, played through a computer, run through a mixer, reproduced by
studio monitors. Everything suddenly seemed so Marxian-my beloved companion in musical intimacy
was no more than a blow-up doll of commodity fetishism, and all of the electronics reproducing it a
materialistic substitute for the activity of music.
Designification
"Untitled One" is a fitting musical object for this experiment due to its replacement of lexical text with
gibberish (57). By eliminating all lexical signs, the urge to wrap music into text-music metaphors was
eliminated (58), allowing me to become intimate with the piece in the same way that I often listen to
instrumental music. One might recall Rosolato once again here, who suggests that this intimacy, which
originates from the mother's voice, may create for us a deterritorialized space in which the listener begins
to feel "oceanic," carried away in currents of pure sonority (59).
However, as studies in musical hermeneutics have shown, instrumental music, especially tonal, can also
exhibit signifying traits without text (60). When we hear a tonal progression, we wrap the music within
hierarchical, extra-musical functions through tonality. Even if one might argue that tonality is not an extra
-musical concept, it is certainly not embedded in a specific musical object (61). In order to limit the
signification of functional tonality, I chose "Untitled One" for its less-hierarchical modal harmonic
language.
Even in this cyclical progression I still found myself keying into arrivals of the A-flat and D-flat major
triads as more structurally significant that the weaker F minor, B-flat minor, and inverted E-flat major. In
fact, my lack of intimacy was bound with a longing for analysis, a sort of signification in which we assign
orderly labels to parts of a musical object. At times, this intimacy experiment derailed into a glorified
ear-training exercise.
Instead of being-analyst when I should be becoming-intimate, I took a break to perform some basic
transcription and analysis of the piece. Whereas wrapping the counterpoint, hypermeter, and form had
previously distracted me, completing this analysis facilitated greater intimacy. In fact, the analysis
actually made me more entwined with the music due to my increased familiarity with the piece.
Nowhere in Deleuze and Guattari's section on the musical refrain, Rahn's essay on Repetition, or Dora
Hanninen's essay on Recontextualization is the issue of previous experiences with a specific piece of
music examined (62). While Rahn's definition of intra-opus repetition [A=(a, then a)] does expand to
include repeated listening experiences of a single piece [A=(A, then A)], it does not include an x or y
variable to account for differing circumstances of those experiences (63). Hanninen's model does account
for this recontextualization, but only at the inter-opus level, which avoids repetitions of the same piece.
Though all three avoid this concept because it seems extra-musical and signifying, those previous
experiences were part of a listening experience; and, since becoming-music leads us to a deterritorialized
space somewhere between listening subject and musical object, the distinctions between musical and
"extra-musical" become attenuated.
This listening experiment suggests a theoretical framework whereby a listening subject's initial desire for
becoming-intimate with a piece may potentially lead to exploring lines of flight which deterritorialize that
listening subject into a state of becoming-music. In my experiments, the more I was able to
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deterritorialize the three strata, the closer I reached a state of becoming-imperceptible. The aftermath of
those near-imperceptible experiences left me with the array of emotions one may feel after experiencing
deep sexual intimacy: exhilarated, incapacitated, fulfilled, penetrated, even vulnerable. In the more
powerful deterritorializations, there was smiling, shaking, even tears. In the less successful
deterritorializations, there were feelings of regret, insatiability, and frustration. Although both musical
and sexual intimacy involve deterritorialization, and both may involve any combination of
desubjectification, deobjectification, and designification, the question of whether temporal displacement
of a specific becoming-music (e.g., recalling past intimate experiences, or repeating those experiences)
constitutes a signifying gesture, somehow wrapping the present becoming-music by relating it to another
becoming-music, remains unanswered. Ultimately, the desire for absolute desubjectification is not only
impossible, but also not in accord with the underlying project of A Thousand Plateaus-subjectification is
a process, not a state of nature:
"Incorporeal transformations, incorporeal attributes [expression], apply to bodies, and only to bodies
[subjects/content] [...]. The independence of the form of expression and the form of content is not the
basis for a parallelism between them or a representation of one by the other, but on the contrary a
parceling of the two, a manner in which expressions are inserted into contents" (64).
Readers versed in the musicological literature will undoubtedly notice a spirit of the so-called "new
musicology" movement in the foregoing analysis (65). This is because the split between a subjective new
musicology and a more empirically grounded music theory itself mirrors the split between a
Rortian-cum-Deleuzian pragmatism and a more empirically grounded analytical philosophy. Rorty's
"ironist" (66), qua Eiron, rescues Deleuze and Guattari from the character of Alazôn in which many
academics have cast him. Thus, my call for a more pragmatic Deleuzo-Guattarian musicology entails the
recognition that Deleuze and Guattari share more with Nietzsche and Rorty than with Wittgenstein or
Russell. While I have focused on how Deleuze and Guattari can help us hear music in different ways, we
must also allow for the possibility that music can provide for us the line of flight necessary to understand
the diverse philosophies of Deleuze and Guattari differently.
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